Today I thought I would start to lay the foundations of my own thinking on this subject. Previously I have posted about the work of the Resilient Orgs project in New Zealand and some aspects of the High Reliability school.
I don’t see a lot of value in offering one of the dictionary definitions as a starting point. The term ‘resilience’ is not new, it has just recently become fashionable to use it everywhere. A range of disciplines use the concept, including psychology, engineering and ecology. So as a result we have a number of different definitions to start from, all of which have value when considered in their proper context.
In order to address resilience in an organisation, we need to address the resilience of the different components that make up that organisation. For the sake of a starting point, let us say that an organisation is made of People, Process and Technology.
We also know that an organisation does not exist in a vacuum, so we need to include an assessment of the environment – and especially in todays world, an organisation is more and more reliant on its supply chain and public communications infrastructure.
I have a degree in Social Sciences, majoring in Sociology. So I guess it is not that surprising that I would start talking about resilience in terms of how groups of people act, and that I would look at the people aspect as being a significant part of the picture.
As well as looking at the resilience of these components, we need to consider the context we are assessing ‘resilience to’ – no entity can be immune to all threats. And the degree to which we can claim something is resilient (especially in the Technology space) is a function of how much we are willing to invest in resilience.
Finally, for today, traditional Risk Management will not adequately identify all aspects of resilience – nor drive the implementation.
It is not enough to be resilient to High Probablility/High Impact events. We need to be resilient to Low Probability/High Impact events too. To truely claim being resilient we need to have some capacity to respond to those Black Swan events - the threats that generally are not currently included in our risk frameworks.
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